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联邦“绿色”高速公路:3000英里远(第一部分:选址政治与国家财富转移

By Robert Peltier -- September 22, 2009

尽管2003年8月美国东北部和中西部大面积停电等警钟敲响,州际输电的投资并没有跟上对更多电力容量的需求。输电选址权已经成为那些声称“不在我的后院”(NIMBY)综合症正在推动美国能源政策的人的口头禅。联邦能源监管委员会有机会通过该法案,展示其国家选址权力Energy Policy Act of 2005(EPAct), but their game plan未能通过法院审查.Today, siting new transmission remains a state’s rights issue as it has always been.

由于越来越多的可再生能源项目,传输选址争议正在增加,这些能源项目越来越多,希望以稀缺的传输能力互连。现在,由于国家可再生组合标准的潜力,另一层复杂性是在发挥的潜力,如果不是数千个of new renewable projects that will all seek priority for grid access.

由于输电升级成本过高,目前正在开发的新可再生能源项目已经在排队等待现有线路的输电能力或新线路的建设。其他项目非常偏远,只有专门建造的输电线路才能将能源推向市场。

国会领导人提议建造新的输电线路,专门用于移动通信,这给不确定性增加了不确定性only可再生能源海岸到海岸,州的权利将具有次要的重要性。Regardless, ratepayers will end up paying the tens of billions of dollars for these new lines and further driving up the cost of electricity.

Below, we discuss how FERC failed to implement the siting authority granted in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and provide a case study on the reasons for failure. Part II (tomorrow) will look at the latest rendition of the siting authority power grab: Obama’s promise of a 3,000 mile coast-to-coast “green power” superhighway. We’ll also discuss the recent work by regional transmission planning organizations to bring renewable energy to market and the costs to do so. It won’t come as a surprise that the costs are extremely high.

新的传输网站可能需要数年

Siting new transmission lines is an exercise in patience and endurance. The industry has plenty of war stories about state, county or local authorities being unable or unwilling to approve new transmission projects, especially projects that merely transit through a state to get energy to an out-of-state market. One of the long running and always contentious debates is the resistance of Connecticut residents to allow transmission of electricity generated upstate to pass that power through to New York City.

在我的记忆中,一个项目如何成为职业生涯的最令人震惊的例子之一是AEP的怀俄明州-杰克逊轮渡线在项目启动后的2006-16年完工,其中14年是在选址问题上争论不休。

另一个例子;在20世纪80年代后期孵化的计划,以将富裕的西弗吉尼亚州的剩余电力移动到电力短路,新泽西州和纽约由于宾夕法尼亚州的反对而在20世纪90年代初坠毁。来自Keystone State的代表们恰当地问道:“对我们来说是什么?”答案:“不多。”宾夕法尼亚州回应,“不谢谢”。项目结束,经过几十年的争论。

国会已经多次尝试减少这些延误,并缩短添加最需要的新传输能力所需的时间。每次新法律都失败了。

最近的尝试是在外观中的规定,如果原子能机构决定他们将减少系统拥塞,则会让FERCE的权力覆盖国家和地方反对州际传输线的建设。2007年4月,能源部指定了两个有资格获得此类待遇的地区作为“国家利益电力传输走廊”。一个人覆盖了从马里兰州到纽约和西部的宽阔的领土。另一个包括一大块南加州,内华达州南部(包括拉斯维加斯),以及亚利桑那州的一切都前往凤凰城。

在宣布当时的计划计划,那么能源秘书塞缪尔·博德曼表示,“塑造了20世纪的能源政策的狭隘利益将不再工作。”也许是这样,但不是服务“国家利益”,拟议的走廊看起来很像很多偷猎路线。据说他们的结果使得在本地抵抗建筑物的地区能够购买从其他地区购买更便宜的电力 - 以避免支付“他们”权力的全部费用。这个计划的问题是,它使野蛮的产生区域具有环境和损失 - 资源成本和后果。

加利福尼亚梦想

Sunrise Powerlink无疑是圣地亚哥天然气与电力公司(SDG&E)多年来开发的最雄心勃勃的项目。最近批准的项目正在运行一条新的150英里的输电线路,从圣地亚哥向东进入沙漠。SDG&E称,这条连接线将刺激可再生能源(地热和太阳能)的发展,降低输电系统阻塞成本,并“减少向运营成本更高的当地老化发电厂支付的补贴”

第二个和第三个理由是密切相关的,往往被媒体忽视。在支持其国家走廊命名的报告中,能源部指出,它认为南加州电网“陷入困境”的最大原因之一,是加州那些老电厂(通常是城市地区的燃气机组)运行成本高昂。毫不奇怪:SDG&E已经有30多年没有在其服务领域建造新的发电厂了。

In the interest of full disclosure, I worked on the design and construction of SDG&E’s last major power plant project Encina Unit 5 when it was constructed in 1976-78. I was also present when then-CEO Tom Page announced in 1978 that SDG&E was not going to construct any more plants but would become a “wires” company and in the future import energy from other sources rather than construct any new plants. To do so was a pure business decision made at the time given the resistance of local governments and citizens to building any more power plants. This business plan was a conscious decision to avoid building local generation and rely solely on imported energy to cover load growth. To their credit, the plan has worked for over 30 years, but now Arizona has the surplus power capacity and a growing population and is unwilling to share their electricity resources. This is a规则改变者for Southern California.

Buddy, Can You Spare a Megawatt?

I recently drove my 4WD truck to the top of a small mountain just south of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona, about 100 miles from the California border. The power park view warms a power engineer’s heart: The three-unit 3,739-MW nuke lies to the north, and to the south sit Sempra’s 1,250-MW Mesquite Generating Station, Pinnacle West Energy’s 1,136-MW Redhawk Power Plant, and LS Power’s 713-MW Arlington Valley Energy Facility. Travel over the next hill and south a few miles and you’ll find the 2,400-MW Panda Gila River Project. All but Palo Verde are gas-fired combined-cycle plants.

I’d venture that a big chunk of the more than 9,200 MW is just aching to find a path into Southern California. Why? The average retail electricity price is almost 50% higher there than in Arizona: 15 cents/kWh vs. 8.5 cents/kWh. Finding new customers willing to pay more for the same commodity would be a business coup for the plants’ owners. The only hurdle would be permitting the new lines needed to deliver it. But the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC) has a different vision of how that power will be used—generate it in Arizona, use it in Arizona.

To its credit, the ACC saw through the “master plan” scheme and unanimously voted down a Southern California Edison (SCE) proposal to build a 231-mile transmission line to connect the power park to a substation near Palm Springs (and ultimately to the Sunrise Powerlink and points west). SCE execs argued that the link would “increase the state’s ability to transmit energy.” What they really meant was the ability to transmit energy to Southern California. Bill Mundell, an Arizona energy commissioner, explained the rejection succinctly at the time: “I don’t want Arizona to be the energy farm for California.” Commissioner Kris Mayes added, “You [SCE] are trying to drop a giant extension cord into Arizona.”

The final meeting on the project turned a bit testy when commissioners quizzed Dian Grueneich of the California Public Utilities Commission about her state’s recent lack of progress building new power plants and transmission lines. Mundell asked, “Why should Arizona put its natural resources, environment, and future energy supply on the line while California does relatively little?”

这确实是加州在蚂蚱和蚂蚁的更新版本的Aesop寓言版本中询问亚利桑那州。这正是为什么整个国家利益走廊计划将面临权力“捐助国”的挑战。在加利福尼亚州的情况下,征税,令人讨厌的燃煤电力进入北方的状态和强烈武装到东部,以获得更大的现有燃气能力,是一项投入失败的能源计划。内华达州,留意这些家伙。

New Developments

由于无法说服亚利桑那州的公用事业专员批准这条新的电力线,加州公用事业公司如愿以偿:要求联邦能源监管委员会介入,行使EPAct授予他们的部分权力,让亚利桑那州接入他们的延长线。联邦能源管理委员会试图调解分歧,但没有成功,随后制定了一项命令,迫使亚利桑那州同意互联。不可避免的联邦法院诉讼结果。

2009年2月,联邦上诉法院拍打了联邦能源监管委员会(FERC)的手,原因是该委员会在宣称自己有权推翻州政府的决定时,对法律作出了“广泛的解释”,过度行使了EPAct授予该机构的权力。

美国里士满的美国第四巡回赛院审法院。发布了decisionin a case brought against the regulatory commission by the Piedmont Environmental Council and multiple states and parties—including the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC).

在此事的核心是由举行议会授予的权威,委员会允许委员会在受影响的国家“扣除批准超过一年之后批准州际电力线路。但在2006年11月的发布中,FERC实质性地解释了这一短语,“批准批准超过一年”,以包括在一年的法定时间范围内拒绝许可。

The petitioners had filed requests for rehearing on FERC’s final rule, arguing that the agency had erred in its interpretation. The parties also asked the court to review several rulemaking decisions FERC had made with the application of that interpretation.

“联邦能源监管委员会的解释与法令的明确含义背道而驰,”法官布莱恩·迈克尔(blanemichael)为多数派写道简单地说,当一个州在一年期限内肯定地拒绝了许可申请时,法规没有给予联邦能源监管委员会许可权。”

Michael said that FERC’s standing interpretation would mean that state commissions would lose jurisdiction unless they approved every permit application in a national interest corridor. “Under such a reading it would be futile for a state commission to deny a permit based on traditional considerations like cost and benefit, land use and environmental impacts, and health and safety. It would be futile, in other words, for a commission to do its normal work,” he wrote.

The court’s decision now sets hurdles for FERC-approved projects whose public commissions have issued denials but that hasn’t slowed down the pressure to overhaul (again) the provision of the EPAct failed to pass judicial scrutiny.

In essence, FERC powers granted under EPAct were neutralized by the appeals court’s decision and Arizona’s rejection of the construction of a new transmission line stands.

但是,这个法院的判决不终结the push for federalizing transmission siting authority. Far from it. The next page of the game plan uses the supposed need for a “green” coast-to-coast transmission superhighway as cover for nationalizing all future transmission siting decisions.

— Also contributing to this article was Sonal Patel, POWER senior writer

5条评论


  1. 理查德W. Fulmer

    我想知道,如果我们不停止在这个国家建造核电站,佩尔蒂埃先生出色的职位中描述的输电线路选址问题会在多大程度上得到缓解。除燃气发电厂外,大多数其他类型的发电设施往往靠近其一次能源(如煤矿、风廊道、阳光充足的地区)。由于核燃料的体积要小得多,核燃料不必建在铀矿附近,而是可以放在消费者附近。

    这导致了另一个问题。什么是构建风电场的“碳足迹”与其传输线与构建核心或煤气厂及其(较短)输电线路?彻底的研究必须包括清除线条的“碳成本”。假设风电场足迹较大,在开始“节约”碳排放之前,将需要多少年的“赶上”到天然气植物?

    Reply

  2. Michael Goggin,美国风能协会

    Contrary to what this article claims, building new transmission would actually make consumers better off by giving them access to lower cost power and by improving the efficiency and reliability of the grid. For more on this topic:
    http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/transmission_and_consumer_savings.pdf.
    http://www.awea.org/GreenPowerSuperhighways.pdf

    Michael Goggin,美国风能协会

    Reply

  3. 理查德W. Fulmer

    迈克尔,
    也许我误读了佩尔蒂埃先生的文章,但我的理解是,他并没有说输电线路不好。他说,由于当地的抵抗,他们很难建造。

    Reply

  4. John Droz

    Mr. Goggin is doing an excellent job as a lobbyist: spinning every situation for the benefit of his client. This assures his continued employment.

    建设数千英里的输电线路并不会让消费者过得更好,但风能开发商(他的雇员)会。

    如果考虑到政府补贴,风电并不是真正的“低成本电”。请阅读EIA报告,该报告显示了风电成本到底有多高。

    Contrary to Mr. Goggin’s unsupported assertion, adding more wind energy to the grid will result in LESS reliability. There should be some penalty for misrepresentation.

    Here is a more accurate assessment of the “Smart” grid “http://www.infrastructurist.com/2009/02/23/the-smart-grid-a-little-stupid/”.

    Reply

  5. Patience

    If you want an example of a transmission line money grab, take a look at the failed Potomac Appalachian Transmission Highline (PATH) project, which was intended to carry coal-fired power from WV to a substation in MD.

    是的,我有很多反对者——但那t’s because opponents proved, more than once, that it was not “needed” to protect “reliability.” Indeed, the final nail in PATH’s coffin was when Dominion Power (not one of the companies involved in PATH) proposed rebuilding an old transmission line – cause of most of the alleged “future” problems. When new scenarios were run to assess the impact on “reliability” the rebuilt line would have, poof! All the problems moved out at least 15 years, i.e., outside PJM’s “planning horizon.”

    土地所有者愤怒的另一个来源:公司对项目目的的代表性的不诚实。

    You state above that “a plan hatched in the late 1980s to move surplus power from coal power-rich West Virginia to power-short New Jersey and New York crashed in the early 1990s due to the opposition of Pennsylvania.”

    这条路是该计划的再生,穿过西弗吉尼亚州、弗吉尼亚州和马里兰州,跳过宾夕法尼亚州。马里兰州的拟建变电站是该项目的“终点站”,其中包括未来线路的空位,以便将电力输送到……新泽西州!公司可能会撒谎说实话-他们是得到它的MD,而其他公司将负责下一阶段的项目,建立新的线路从变电站到新泽西州。

    We can read a map. (As well as PJM’s various planning documents, reports, etc.) The MD-to-NJ line wasn’t in the RTEP … until the spring of 2010.

    现在路径是僵尸项目;它是“暂停”,但这些公司正在继续在14.3%的激励ROE中撤退。这是一个Ferc从未创建或授权的类别,但公司推荐的是PJM - 已掩盖他们可以这样做。呵呵。

    If you want to understand why citizens are so resistant to transmission projects, it’s because we are lied to, we are cheated, we are manipulated, and we are utterly cynical about the motives of all the institutional players, from FERC to the RTOs to the individual companies (and in some cases our own state agencies). We are shut out of the planning process, our concerns are dismissed out of hand, and somehow “the national good” always means we take it in the shorts.

    As near as I can tell, there is no HONEST conversation under way at any level to develop national energy and transmission policy. It is ALWAYS about the Benjamins.

    Reply

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